Articles About Investments

In November of 2016, a joint 18-month study from the State Street Center for Applied Research and the CFA Institute, which combined 200 in-depth interviews with global industry leaders and a survey of 3,300 "investment professionals", was released, and claimed to have discovered "the hidden variable of [organizational] performance". Dubbed "Phi", the research suggested that a combination of the motivational forces of Purpose, Habits, and Incentives was associated with superior organizational outcomes; specifically, the results showed that a one-point increase in Phi was associated with 28% greater odds of excellent organizational performance, 55% greater odds of excellent client satisfaction, and 57% greater odds of excellent employee engagement.

In this guest post, Derek Tharp – our new Research Associate at Kitces.com, and a Ph.D. candidate in the financial planning program at Kansas State University – analyzes the Phi study and delves deeper into exactly what it is, how it is measured, and what conclusions should (and shouldn't) be drawn from this study.

Because while the researchers did find a statistically significant relationship between Phi (as measured by self-reported purpose, habits, and incentives), and organizational outcomes, client satisfaction, and employee engagement, it's not entirely clear what the results actually prove.

The challenge, in part, is that the study itself didn't actually evaluate organizational performance, client satisfaction, or employee engagement! Instead, the researchers evaluated self-reported assessments of organizational performance, client satisfaction, and employee engagement, and compared them to self-reported statistics on Phi (for the entire organization). And this distinction is meaningful, because it isn't exactly clear that employees make valid or reliable assessments of company-wide motivational forces, nor the entire company's organizational performance, client satisfaction, or employee engagement — and especially when these employees may not actually even know if clients' goals are being met (how "organizational performance" was defined), whether clients or satisfied, or whether other employees within a large multinational financial services firm are actually even engaged!

In addition, there's the fundamental challenge that a correlation between two data points doesn't necessarily prove causation either. In other words, the fact that high-performing organizations also report higher Phi doesn't mean the higher Phi caused the better results. Perhaps organizations that are already outperforming simply attract more motivated employees (which means the causality goes the other direction).

In the end, the Phi study did ask some interesting questions and set out with some lofty ambitions to evaluate the impact of motivational forces - a question that is admittedly not easy to study. But until further research can tie Phi to actual outcomes or provide evidence that the self-reported measures are assessing something meaningful in a valid and reliable way, then the conclusions we can actually draw from the Phi research are limited.

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The research on the optimal strategy to generate retirement income from a portfolio has been evolving for decades.

In the 1950s and 1960s, with the initial rise of a portfolio-based retirement, the leading strategy was simply to buy bonds and spend the interest (by literally “clipping the coupons” from the bearer bonds of the time). Until the inflation of the 1970s ravaged the purchasing power of bond interest.

The harsh consequences of inflation on bond portfolios led to a dramatic shift by the 1980s, as retirees increasingly purchased high-quality dividend-paying stocks instead, counting on the ability of businesses to raise prices and keep pace with inflation… which also helps their dividends to rise and keep pace with inflation as well.

The dividend strategy was popular until eventually retirees realized that owning stocks and focusing on the dividends, while ignoring the capital gains, just leads to large retirement account balances that could have been spent along the way. As a result, by the 1990s, retirement portfolio strategies shifted again, to consider a more holistic “total return” approach that incorporates interest, dividends, and capital gains as well.

Unfortunately, though, capital gains may be one of the largest drivers of total return in the long run, but it’s also one of the least stable, forcing the retiree to periodically rely on the portfolio principal as well. Of course, in the end, retirement principal that is unspent is arguably a wasted spending opportunity – where the “optimal” retirement portfolio is for the last check to the undertaker to bounce. On the other hand, given the uncertainty of a retiree’s time horizon – not knowing when you’re going to die – means in practice, the principal can and should be used more dynamically, spending from it in some years but leaving it untouched in others.

Which means ultimately, the modern retirement portfolio will really rely on four pillars for retirement income – interest, dividends, capital gains, and principal. Or stated more accurately, the four pillars of retirement cash flows – since the treatment of the pillars as “income” for tax purposes can vary depending on both the pillar itself (interest is taxable and principal liquidations are not), and the varying types of retirement accounts (from pre-tax IRAs to tax-free Roth accounts).

Nonetheless, the fundamental point is simply to recognize that a retirement portfolio has multiple ways to generate the desired cash flows for retirement. And in fact, in a low yield environment, it can be especially important to diversify across all four pillars – or retirees take on additional risks in stretching for yield, from interest rate and default risk (from longer-term or lower-quality bonds), to the concentration risks of buying just a subset of the highest dividend-paying sectors (which, as the financial crisis showed, can expose the portfolio to severe risk along the way!).

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From its start in 1980, the 12b-1 fee was controversial – a distribution charge assessed against current mutual fund investors, that the fund company can use to market the fund to new investors. In other words, the mutual fund got to use investor dollars (rather than its own money) to grow the fund’s assets under management (AUM).

In theory, this use of the mutual fund investor’s own money to market the fund company’s products was supposed to be good for the investor, because it would help grow and scale the fund and bring down its operating expense ratio. However, several decades later, subsequent analysis is finding that while mutual funds that charge 12b-1 fees are successful at incentivizing salespeople to bring in more assets under management, the 12b-1 fee isn’t living up to its promise of helping to scale up and bringing down the expense ratio as the mutual fund grows.

At the same time, the reality is that investor behaviors are shifting as well. A growing number of consumers are purchasing their investments directly, avoiding the 12b-1 fee altogether by eliminating the mutual fund salesperson middleman. And as more and more financial advisors become affiliated with an RIA firm and get paid an AUM fee on an advisory account, the 12b-1 fee is less and less of a driver to incentivize financial advisors anyway.

In fact, the entire shift of financial advisors from being mutual fund salespeople (compensated by upfront commissions and ongoing 12b-1 fees) to operating as actual financial advisors instead (compensated by fees directly from their clients) raises the question of whether the 12b-1 fee is still relevant at all. Especially given the 12b-1 fee’s controversial roots, and the misalignment it creates between who pays the marketing and distribution costs, and who actually benefits from it.

Of course, the reality is that financial advisors, custodians, broker-dealers, and product providers still need to get paid for what they do, which means eliminating the 12b-1 fee still won’t necessarily bring down costs for the end client. Instead, it would likely just shift where and how financial advisors and their platforms get paid. Nonetheless, given the 12b-1 fee’s implicit conflicts, and their declining relevance, arguably it’s time to create a more appropriate pricing structure for the realities of today’s investment marketplace!

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Even for financial advisors, the proliferation in recent years of different variable annuity and mutual fund share classes can be overwhelming. Some companies may have as many as 15+ share classes for a single investment strategy, all with unique advisor compensation, surrender charges, and fees. Yet by definition, not all of these share classes can possibly be the best for any particular investor. And in too many cases, it's simply a matter of the advisor choosing how they wish to get paid.

In this week’s #OfficeHours with @MichaelKitces, my Tuesday 1PM EST broadcast via Periscope, we discuss why there are only a few share classes necessary under a fiduciary rule, and why that means there's an impending fiduciary armageddon for (most) mutual fund and variable annuity share classes coming soon!

Because the reality is that the differences amongst most share classes ultimately boils down to the different ways that mutual fund companies pay distribution costs - i.e., commissions - across various sales channels. Those who preferred upfront commissions would sell A or B shares, while those who preferred levelized commissions would sell C shares, and those who got paid an advisory fee would charge their 1% AUM fee separately and use institutional or advisory share classes instead. Retirement plans and 529 plans cut their own deals as well, for their own share class alternatives. And the client got whichever share class happened to be sold by the broker or plan they were working with, and paid the associated cost, including embedded commissions, 12b-1 fees, and sub-TA fees, that may or may not apply.

But in a fiduciary world, the advisor is always expected to use the lowest cost share class for the client. Notably, the fiduciary rule doesn't actually require that advisors use the lowest cost fund, period; it's a myth that the fiduciary rule requires index funds to the exclusion of actively managed funds. However, if the advisor is going to recommend an actively managed fund... it better be the cheapest version of the fund available, because using anything different would represent a conflict of interest for the advisor enriching themselves at the expense of the client with an unecessarily-more-expensive product.

Yet taken to its logical conclusion, this means that most variable annuity and mutual fund share classes will be rendered entirely irrelevant under DoL fiduciary! At best, there may only be 2 share classes available - the uniform-commission T share for those who are paid some moderate upfront commission, and an institutional or advisory share class for everyone else (who separately charge their own advisory fee on top). And the other dozen or more share classes just vanish!

Of course, the transition may not happen immediately. Not only is there the potential that DoL fiduciary will at least be delayed, but given that it only applies to retirement investors, other share classes may still get used in non-retirement accounts for a while longer. But the key point is that under a fiduciary rule, there is only a legitimate need for one or two share classes at most. As a result, whether it's the Department of Labor fiduciary rule, or one that the SEC follows with in a few years, what we'll soon see is an armageddon that destroys most mutual fund and variable annuity share classes, as we complete the shift from being brokers who sell whatever products we can get paid to sell, into advisors who actually sell advice and implement the best solutions we can at the lowest cost they're available for!

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The process of assessing an investor’s risk tolerance is all about determining his/her willingness to take investment risk, and financial capacity to bear risk, and blending it together to match to an appropriate investment portfolio. Most commonly, this is done with a risk tolerance questionnaire that posits a series of questions about time horizon and need for income, and attitudes about risk and market volatility, to calculate a “risk score” and determine the portfolio that goes with it.

The caveat to this one-dimensional approach, however, is that by averaging together risk tolerance and risk capacity scores, the advisor can unwittingly end up in situations where clients with extremely low risk tolerance (or risk capacity) end up with portfolios that are far too risky for their situation. In other words, the low risk tolerance (or capacity) should have acted as a constraint to the investment policy statement, but didn’t.

So what’s the alternative? Simply put – risk tolerance and risk capacity should be measured separately, and then scored on a two-dimensional scale that considers the contributing role (and limiting nature) of each (rather than a single continuum that merely averages the two together).

Fortunately, there are numerous risk tolerance software solutions specifically designed to assess “pure” risk tolerance on a standalone basis, including FinaMetrica and Riskalyze. And for comprehensive financial planners, the reality is that the financial plan itself is a measure of risk capacity, as reflected in the Monte Carlo probabilities of success and failure.

For those who don’t do full retirement planning projections for every client, a recent alternative software solution is Tolerisk, which is designed to perform a two-dimensional risk tolerance assessment by separately gathering information about the client’s risk attitudes and their basic financial goals.

The bottom line, though, is simply to recognize that risk tolerance and risk capacity are two different dimensions of the client’s overall risk profile, and must be assessed and ‘scored’ separately to properly recognize the constraining role that each can have on the appropriate investment policy statement!

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The “Paradox of Skill” is the recognition that as the average skill level of a group increases, it actually becomes harder and harder for superstars to occur; as the skill level rises, the variability around the group average declines. This phenomenon helps to explain why despite the improvement in baseball players, no one has hit over .400 since Ted Williams did it 75 years ago, and also provides insight on why it’s getting harder and harder to find “good” active investment managers. Because the whole field has gotten so much better, it’s actually become incredibly difficult to stand out from the (already excellent) pack.

As a result, a growing base of data suggests that the amount of available alpha is shrinking, a combination of both the paradox of skill itself, and the mere fact that more and more investment research is revealing previously unknown investment factors that, once known, can no longer be exploited the way they were in the past.

Yet despite this trend, a number of known investment opportunities have continued to persist, even though they’re widely known. For instance, it’s long since been documented that small cap outperforms large cap, that value generates a long term premium over growth, and that stocks exhibit momentum effects. But for all the research showing these outperformance opportunities to be available, investors fail to invest sufficiently to fully take advantage of them.

The gap, however, may be at least partially explained by the growing field of behavioral finance, and research that shows all the ways that we fail to invest “rationally” despite having all the available information (or without bothering to get it in the first place). And in point of fact, many of the most popular – and persistent – alpha opportunities, from small caps to value to momentum, are actually well-explained by common behavioral biases (including the availability, familiarity, and recency biases) that are hard-wired into our brains. Which helps to explain why they’re persistent – because their very nature is the tendency to impact our investment decisions, even when we “should” know better.

Of course, the caveat is that “sustainable alpha” opportunities created by persistent behavioral biases may be the hardest to exploit, precisely because those behavioral biases impact us as well – both in the investment decisions we make, and as advisors, the investment decisions we must justify to clients (who themselves have the same biases). Or viewed another way, it may be the persistent challenge and “risk” of trying to buck the behavioral trends that generates the risk premium associated with sustainable alpha in the first place!

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The rise of Vanguard and ETFs in the past decade has been nothing short of astonishing, with trillions of inflows to ETF assets, and Vanguard adding more assets in the past 5 years than they did cumulatively in their first 35. Yet the question arises: why was it that made the past decade or two the rise of passive investing. Why didn't it happen sooner? Why did it take Vanguard decades for the idea of the index fund to really gain traction?

In this week’s #OfficeHours with @MichaelKitces, my Tuesday 1PM EST broadcast via Periscope, I offer an 'alternative' explanation for the rise of passive investing, that has little to do with the performance of passive vs active itself. Instead, I think the real catalyst that changed the flows from active to passive funds was the internet.

Because the reality is that before the internet, the average investor didn't have the tools to know that so many actively managed mutual funds underperformed their benchmarks, and how to select which were the few funds that were actually good. Instead, most investors could only look at quarterly statements, or the Wall Street Journal's pages of stock prices, and figure out that they had "made money" because the investment was up. But not actually whether it was up more or less than it should have been, given peer comparisons.

With the rise of the internet, though, the tools suddenly became widely available. Investors could actually do real performance benchmarking and cost comparisons for the first time. The tools were finally available to shine a bright light on relative mutual fund performance, and easily identify the laggards. The technology was a transformative moment for real transparency on performance, and putting it into an easily usable format.

And now the trend only continues, likely to be accelerated by the DoL fiduciary rule, which will require all financial advisors working with retirement accounts to use those kinds of tools to do their own investment due diligence. While DoL fiduciary didn't ban commissions, it does require a recommendation that non-commissioned prudent expert would have also suggested, which means advisors who sell commissioned products have a substantial burden to prove why they're that good.

In fact, the ultimately conclusion of this trend may actually be a tremendous consolidation of the entire ETF and index fund world. Because the reality is that with transparent tools to make it easier than ever to find the best - which when it comes to commoditized index funds, is often nothing more than a comparison of which is the cheapest - there's no longer a need for 100 ETFs to track an index, nor 10, nor even three. Instead, these are "winner takes all" markets - which is exactly why the ETF price wars are underway, and are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

All caused by the transparency that good technology brings!

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The requirement that a financial advisor must “Know Your Client”, including his/her tolerance for taking risks, is a universal requirement amongst investment regulators around the world.

Yet a recent survey of the global landscape for best practices in risk profiling by Canadian financial planning software provider PlanPlus reveals a disturbing lack of quality risk tolerance questionnaires (RTQ) and support tools for financial advisors. In part, this appears to be driven by the fact that regulators articulate the principle of “know your client’s risk tolerance” but provide little guidance on how it should be done to ensure that it’s right. And to a large extent, the problem stems from the reality that neither regulators, academics, nor advisors themselves, even have agreement on exactly what key factors of a client’s “risk profile” should be evaluated in the first place.

Nonetheless, a growing base of academic research is beginning to articulate a clear risk profiling framework, from recognizing the separation of risk tolerance from risk capacity, the role of risk perception (and misperceptions) on client behavior, and how “risk composure” (the stability of a client’s perceptions of risk) itself can vary from one cline to the next. Of course, just because these factors can be identified doesn’t make them easy to measure with a questionnaire, especially when it comes to “subjective” abstract traits like risk tolerance. On the other hand, the research suggests that financial advisors just trying to interview clients about risk may not be doing a better job, either.

In the end, the optimal approach may eventually be a combination of both, where psychometrically designed risk tolerance questionnaires assess a client’s willingness to pursue risky trade-offs, and the financial advisor can then assess the client’s risk capacity, financial goals, and ability to achieve their objectives given the constraint of their tolerance. And ultimately, an effective risk tolerance questionnaire may not only make it easier to properly match investment solutions to a client’s needs, but also make it easier to manage client risk perceptions and investment expectations on an ongoing basis. Or at least identify which clients are most likely to be challenged when the next bear market comes along!

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The idea of having investments be influenced by one’s values and a desire to advance the social good (in addition to personal profits) is not new, but in recent decades there has been substantial growth in various forms of socially responsible investing (SRI) strategies. However, given the relatively limited number of SRI funds in the marketplace, investors haven’t had a lot to choose from, and the nature of buying an SRI fund or not means the investor is either all-in or all-out for the strategy (at least with that particular portion of the allocation).

Yet with the recent launch of Morningstar Sustainability Ratings, in partnership with Sustainalytics, it now becomes feasible to not just “buy an SRI fund” (or not), but to tilt any portfolio towards sustainable investing, simply by choosing the most sustainable of the available choices in any investment category. With Morningstar’s Sustainability Rating applied to upwards of 20,000 different funds (both mutual funds and ETFs), the investor (or advisor) can screen out the lowest-rated 1- and 2-globe funds, or focus exclusively on the 4- or 5-globe funds (given the 1-to-5 globe rating system).

In fact, the raw Morningstar Sustainability Scores actually reveal that some non-SRI funds are just as sustainably invested as their SRI counterparts, when drilling down to look at the underlying holdings. Despite the explicit sustainability mandate, the funds are nonetheless buying companies that align to relevant environment, social, and governance (ESG) factors anyway – ostensibly because some fund managers (directly or indirectly) find those to be good investment criteria, anyway.

Yet with more investors seeking out sustainable investing – particularly amongst the rising Millennial generation – and the potential to use Morningstar Sustainability Ratings to tilt any portfolio towards sustainable investing simply by using the number of globes as a screen, it suddenly becomes possible for sustainable investing to actually begin to influence markets in the aggregate. After all, as the growth of Morningstar style boxes and their supporting benchmarks have shown, a common “scoring system” for investors to assess outcomes can have a significant impact on fund manager behavior. In turn, if dollars shift more towards sustainable investing strategies – even by just tilting at the margin – it gives fund managers more capital to deploy to companies that score well on ESG factors, and draws capital away from the rest, which means corporate leadership may finally have the incentive it needs to truly behave in a more socially responsible manner?

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Financial advisors and investment management consultants have long recognized that different fund managers have different investment styles. Some focus on stock picking, while others rotate amongst sectors or asset classes based on macroeconomic bets. And those who don’t think active managers can do any of those things successfully simply buy index funds.

In recent years, though, Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto have published research suggesting that many active managers may be closer to an index fund that their investors realize. These “closet indexer” funds can be identified by their low Active Share – a measure created by Cremers and Petajisto to measure the extent to which a portfolio’s holdings deviate from its underlying benchmark, which appears to do a better job than tracking error at identifying which fund managers are really making active bets (or not).

And the Active Share research finds that closet indexers really do tend to underperform. Of course, the result that isn’t entirely surprising, as in general index funds are expected to underperform their benchmark by the amount of their fees, and an actively managed fund with a higher active management fee that really just holds the benchmark anyway would simply amount to an unusually expensive index fund.

Which means Active Share itself can be an effective way to evaluate the appropriateness of an investment manager’s fee in the first place. Funds that have low Active Share and resemble their benchmark will behave like index funds, and should charge index-fund-like fees. By contrast, funds that have higher Active Share – which are taking a larger portion of active portfolio bets – at least have the potential to outperform their higher active management fees. Though ultimately the jury is still out about whether high Active Share funds really outperform on average, or are simply an indicator of which funds might be able to outperform!

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